From Localities via the Spatial Turn to Spatio-Temporal Fixes: A Strategic-Relational Odyssey

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Introduction

The primary focus of my work for the past thirty years has been the critique of political economy. This has involved working on the economy, the political, and, most importantly, the strategic coordination and structural coupling of the economic and political. The significance of place, space, and scale in my approach to these concerns has grown during this period, especially in the last ten years. This has occurred in response to three interrelated sets of influences: first, changes in theoretical objects as I have moved backwards and forwards from relatively abstract-simple issues to more concrete-complex ones; second, methodological shifts in the social sciences that have impacted on my understanding of these objects and/or the real world; and, third, objective changes in the natural and social worlds themselves that have prompted a search for concepts to grasp their historical and/or spatial specificity. One or another set of influences has been dominant at different times but, whichever has been dominant, each set has led to modifications in one or both of the others. The impact of these interlinked changes in my treatment of place, space, and scale has also varied in theoretical, methodological, and practical terms. In some cases, they have led to a simple, incremental empirical extension of my work. Thus I have sometimes just applied a given approach to different places, new types of space, or other scales. In other cases, there has been a more complex, progressive conceptual deepening of my approach. This occurred whenever the ontological and methodological significance of place, space, and scale prompted me to rethink the concrete and complex mediation, overdetermination, and instantiation of specific events, social relations, and processes that I had previously studied in less sophisticated, less spatialized, and, as we shall see below, less temporalized ways. And, sometimes, they have led to ruptural theoretical redefinitions by radically undermining my previously unquestioned assumptions, concepts, and arguments and leading to a fundamental reorientation of my overall approach. This is especially true of my most recent work on spatial imaginaries and spatio-temporal fixes (see table 1).

Table 1 about here

In earlier stages of my work on political economy, incremental empirical extension and progressive conceptual deepening were the main ways in which place, space, and scale came to be integrated. In contrast, in the last ten years, engagement with these issues has contributed to a more radical redefinition of my core assumptions, concepts, and arguments. This is reflected in a new understanding of my overall theoretical project as a post-disciplinary cultural political economy of capitalism based on a systematic theory of its contradictions and dilemmas and how these contradictions and dilemmas are provisionally deferred, displaced, and resolved through temporary, conflictual, and unstable spatio-temporal fixes. The main theoretical influences here have been a rereading and reconstruction of Marx’s critique of political economy and its implications for the inherent improbability of capital accumulation; and a growing appreciation of critical
semiotic analysis. The main methodological influences have been, first, the
discursive turn and, second, the spatial and scalar turns – with the latter
leading me to a radical re-examination of the spatio-temporal dimensions of
capital accumulation, the state, and everyday life. Finally, the main changes
in the real world that have shaped the ruptural redefinition of my theoretical
project have been the relativization of scale in an increasingly global world, a
growing recognition (still not yet fully integrated into my work) of global
ecological crisis, and, most recently, the changing forms of US imperialism.
The following reflections are not intended as a full intellectual biography or
as a complete account of my changing engagement with place, space, and
scale. Instead they are meant to illustrate some key turns in my development
and to draw out their significance for the overall project. Thus I will focus on
four issues: the re-scaling of the state, the relativization of scale, the spatial
imaginary, and spatio-temporal fixes.

Moving Beyond Localities

Let me begin with some brief remarks on my earliest concerns with spatial
issues. Place had a minor role in my now forgotten doctoral research in
political sociology. This explored the influence of place on class identities,
party allegiances, civic awareness, and political culture in England through
survey research and interviews conducted in 1969-1972. This research
demonstrated the importance of specific constituency characteristics on
political attitudes and electoral behaviour in a North-Eastern mining area, an
East Anglian agricultural area, and three north London constituencies – a
deprived multi-ethnic working class constituency, a mixed class and ethnic
community, and a more middle-class suburban and rural area. My
understanding of place was limited then to the combined impact of
occupational community, residential community, and regional identity, and
was grounded in neo-Marxian and neo-Weberian theories of class, status, and
party (Jessop 1974).

While conducting this research, the political aftermath of May 1968 and the
anti-Vietnam War movement drew me to state theory. My early work in the
latter area largely neglected place – apart from the differences between
national capitalisms and/or national states; and scale was considered mainly
in terms of a naturalized distinction between local states, national states, the
European Union, and the international state monopoly capitalist apparatuses.
Overall, when not working on the intractable problem of the specificity of the
capitalist type of state and its relative autonomy, I was especially concerned
with the relation between stages of capitalist development and the state. At
most this prompted indirect interest in shifts in the primary modalities and
centres of growth in the world market. The main theoretical influence on my
more direct but limited work on place, space, and scale was Gramsci, who
was especially sensitive to these issues in his studies of the Italian state, state
formation, and the more general question of hegemony (Gramsci 1971;
Jessop 1982). In the mid-1980s this led to a neo-Gramscian inflected interest,
jointly pursued with three colleagues, in Thatcherism. Among many other
issues we considered its spatiality, especially the privileging of London and
the South-East of England, the promotion of uneven development, and issues of internationalization (Jessop et al., 1988).

In tandem with this research on the changing political economy of the postwar British state, I was trying to develop a political economy of the economy that was theoretically commensurable with my strategic-relational approach to the state. The latter had been criticized by some fundamentalist Marxists as ‘ politicist’, i.e., as too focused on the political level of the state and hence oblivious of its underlying economic determinations. This led to growing interest in the regulation approach, the nature of Fordism, its crisis, and the search for a post-Fordist accumulation regime and post-Fordist mode of regulation. I initially gave a neo-Gramscian state-theoretical inflection to the regulation approach but subsequently linked this to a more thorough-going critique of the political economy of the economy (see Jessop 1997c, 2002).

The early regulation approach, especially its hegemonic Parisian school, was very appealing for a time to a wide range of social scientists, including economic sociologists and economic geographers. This can be seen in a growing body of work on changes in the spatial division of labour, the uneven diffusion and development of the Fordist growth dynamic, the location of Fordist industries, the nature of Fordist cities, and the spatial dynamics of Fordist crises. During the 1980s, however, I absorbed these concerns more through gradual theoretical osmosis than explicit reflection on their full significance. Thus I still tended to see place, space, and scale as naturalized and contextual rather than as socially constructed and materially significant.

It was my mid-1990s work on municipal socialism, entrepreneurial cities, place-marketing, strong and weak forms of inter-urban competitiveness, regional policies in post-socialism, and local governance more generally that consolidated my interest in place (Jessop 1997a, 1997b; Jessop and Sum 2000). This was also when I got interested in cross-border regions and other aspects of economic and political rescaling – including, along with mainstream social science, the issue of the nature, extent, and significance of globalization (Jessop 1995, 1999, 2002). Increasing direct interaction with economic, political, and urban geographers rather than more passive reading of their work also reinforced my sensitivity during this period to issues of place, space, and scale – both in relation to the dangers of methodological nationalism and/or embedded statism in political economy and in relation to the growing disruption of the national scale as an economic, political, social, and cultural container (e.g., Agnew 1994, Taylor 1996). This was also the beginning of productive collaborations with social theorists and geographers concerned with place, space, and scale (e.g., Jessop, Peck, and Tickell 1999; and, most recently, Brenner et al., 2003). This interest eventually led me to include scale as one of four central dimensions for analyzing distinctive forms of the capitalist state, ranking alongside economic policy, social policy, and modes of governance. In this context ‘scale’ signified the dominant scale, if any, on which key political decisions about economic and social policy were made, even if they were implemented and/or supplemented on other scales. And it was in these terms that I contrasted the postwar Keynesian welfare national state with an emerging Schumpeterian workfare post-national regime (for example, Jessop 2002).
Rethinking Place, Space, and Scale

Overall, three issues converged in the 1990s to lead me to rethink previous work: first, place in relation to inter-urban competition and changing forms of local governance; second, scale in relation to the crisis of Fordism, the rise of post-Fordism, the rescaling of economies and states, and the relativization of scale; and, third, space in relation to spatio-temporal fixes and spatial imaginaries. Reflecting on these issues has also prompted a more general reconceptualization of the complex interrelations between space and time from a strategic-relational (hereafter, ‘SRA’) perspective (see the next section).

In addressing inter-urban competition, I realized that changing forms of competition were linked to new economic imaginaries, new political imaginaries, and new scalar and spatial imaginaries. These involve new construals of the economy, the extra-economic, the scope and forms of the political, and the nature of place, space, and scale (see Jessop 2002, 2004b). Competitive strategies are framed within and, where successful, reinforce these new imaginaries. Strategies differ in at least four respects: their respective understandings of the economy as an object of economic management or governance; concepts and discourses of competitiveness – including their changing economic and extra-economic dimensions; the places, nodes, networks, scales, and spatial horizons in and through which economic strategies are pursued; and the relative primacy of the forms of governance with which they are associated. It was in this context that I worked on narratives of enterprise, entrepreneurial cities, and the rise of Schumpeterian workfare post-national regimes (Jessop 1997a, 1997b, 1998); and, later, on the globalizing, knowledge-based economy as the most likely form of post-Fordism (Jessop 2002, 2004b).

One illustration of this work on inter-urban competition was the concept of ‘glurbanization’ introduced by Ngai-Ling Sum and myself as a trend analogous to ‘glocalization’ (Jessop and Sum 2000). While the latter term refers to firms’ strategies to build global advantage by exploiting local differences, the former refers to a local, regional or national state’s strategies to build global advantage by restructuring urban spaces to enhance their international competitiveness (see table 2). This may involve reinforcing local differences and/or introducing ubiquities that enable MNCs to pursue their own ‘glocalization’ strategies. There are strong as well as weak forms of glurbanization strategies. Whereas the former are typical of the leading cities or regions in urban and regional hierarchies, the latter are more often pursued by ‘ordinary cities’ and ‘ordinary regions’ (Amin and Graham 1997). Analogous strategies can, of course, be found on other scales, such as the subregional and cross-border; and, above the level of the national state, the European Union at various stages of its development.

Table 2 about here
I owe the notion of ‘relativization of scale’ to Chris Collinge (1996, 1999) and this is one example of the influence of the scalar turn on my work as I sought to understand major real world changes. Collinge’s conceptual innovation distinguishes dominant and nodal scales in a scalar division of labour. Scale dominance refers to “the power which organizations at certain spatial scales are able to exercise over organizations at other, higher or lower scales” (Collinge 1999: 568). It can derive from the general relationship among different scales considered, in the terms of my strategic-relational approach, as ‘strategically selective’ terrains and/or from the particular features, capacities, and activities of organizations and institutions located at different scales. Nodal scales were defined as ‘scales that are non-dominant in the overall hierarchy of scales but nonetheless serve as the primary loci for the delivery of certain activities in a given spatio-temporal order or matrix (Collinge 1999: 569). Collinge also emphasized that there is no necessary correspondence between position in a hierarchy of scales and dominance or nodality. For example, the local scale was dominant in the 19th century England, the national was nodal; subsequently, cities were integrated into national economic systems and subordinated to the political power of national territorial states; and, with the postwar arrival of Transatlantic Fordism, the national had become dominant, with the local and international nodal. The relativization of scale in turn refers to a crisis of the dominant scale within a scalar hierarchy (such that actors operating on that scale can no longer secure an overall structured coherence within the scalar division of labour) and the failure of these actors (or others) to establish such dominance at another (possibly new) scale in a modified scalar division of labour.v This does not exclude, of course, attempts to re-establish the dominance of the previously dominant scale or a more general struggle for dominance between agents on different scales.

I related this relativization of scale to the crises of Transatlantic Fordism, East Asian exportism, import-substitution industrialization in Latin America, and the collapse of the Soviet Bloc. The national scale had lost the taken-for-granted primacy it held in the economic and political organization of Atlantic Fordism; but no other scale of economic and political organization (whether the global or the local, the urban or the triadic) had yet acquired a similar primacy. Indeed we have seen a proliferation of spatial scales (whether terrestrial, territorial or telematic; see Luke 1994), their relative dissociation in complex tangled hierarchies (rather than a simple nesting of scales) and an increasingly convoluted mix of scale strategies as economic and political forces seek the most favourable conditions for insertion into a changing international order. And the national scale has since been challenged by the rise of global city networks more oriented to other global cities than to national hinterlands. This relativization of scale reinforced economic and political instability, led to a search for new forms of interscalar articulation, and offered increased scope for the development of new scales and for scale jumping. Taking this into account led to a major reconceptualization of globalization as a multi-centric, multi-scalar, multi-temporal, multi-form, and multi-causal process that was closely connected with processes on other scales and by no means always the most important scale on which restructuring, space-time distanniation, and time-space compression occurred (Jessop 1999, 2002).
Combined with earlier work on spatial imaginaries, the relativization of scale highlighted for me the always-contested social construction of scale orders, the relative stability or instability of spatial categories such as place, space, and scale and their spatial properties (or spatialities). As yet, the new politics of scale is unresolved – although I suspect that triads will eventually replace the nation as the primary scale for managing, displacing, and deferring the contradictions and dilemmas of a globalizing, knowledge-based economy. In any case, the struggle to envisage and institutionalize a new (or renewed) set of dominant and nodal scales within a new scalar as well as spatial division of labour led me to explore the ‘post-national’ state in terms of rescaling, restructuring, and, most recently, new forms of multi-level metagovernance (Jessop 2002, 2004a).

This conclusion brings me to the concept of spatio-temporal fix. While there are some parallels here with David Harvey’s work on spatial and temporal fixes (Harvey 1982), vi my distinctive account of this concept initially emerged through my work on state theory and the regulation approach. It was subsequently refined through my re-reading of Marx in an attempt to elaborate a more systematic strategic-relational account of capital’s contradictions. The basic argument runs essentially as follows. There is no single best way to regularize accumulation in the long term. Instead, various second-best solutions emerge as different accumulation regimes, modes of regulation, and associated compromises get institutionalized. These compensate partially for the incompleteness of the pure capital relation and give it a specific dynamic through the linkage between its economic and extra-economic elements. This social fix helps secure a relatively durable structural coherence in managing the contradictions and dilemmas inherent in the capital relation so that different forms, institutions, and practices tend to be mutually reinforcing. This can only occur within the limits of a spatio-temporal fix that establishes specific spatial and temporal boundaries within which a relatively durable pattern of ‘structured coherence’ can be secured and by displacing and/or deferring certain costs of securing this coherence beyond these spatial and temporal boundaries. A given spatio-temporal fix gives a distinctive ranking to the various structural contradictions and strategic dilemmas inherent in capital accumulation – since they cannot all be resolved at once (if at all). It gives a distinctive weighting to different aspects of each contradiction and/or to the horns of each dilemma – sometimes addressing their different moments on different scales and/or over different time horizons (Gough and Eisenschitz 1996). In Atlantic Fordism, for example, the wage and money forms were the principal structural forms at the heart of the mode of regulation; in post-Fordism, other forms have become more important (Petit 1999). States have a key role in balancing the different spatial and temporal frameworks within which this differential treatment occurs, seeking some structural coherence across spatial and scalar divisions of labour and trying to govern the complex dynamics of time-space distanciation and compression across different spheres of activity (e.g., Jessop 2002).

More generally, as noted above, spatio-temporal fixes displace and defer contradictions both within a given economic space and/or political territory and beyond it. They also involve an internal as well as external differentiation of
winners and losers from a particular fix, linked to the uneven social and spatial
distribution of its benefits and to its associated uneven development. Thus,
spatio-temporal fixes also facilitate the institutionalized compromises on which
accumulation regimes and modes of regulation depend, and subsequently
come to embody them. Crises in these fixes are rooted not only in the
dynamics of capital accumulation rooted in the nature of the value form but
also in the nature of the extra-economic institutions and social relations that
secure the circuits of capital. The primary sites and scales and the main
temporal horizons around which such fixes are built and the extent of their
coherence vary considerably over time. This is reflected in the variable
coincidence (and non-coincidence) of different boundaries, borders or
frontiers of economic, political, and other activities crucial to capital
accumulation and in the changing primacy of different spatial and temporal
horizons of action.

The Strategic-Relational Approach

From the 1980s onwards, all of my work on place, space, and scale has
developed in the context of my evolving ‘strategic-relational approach’ to the
question of structure and agency (for a first statement, see Jessop 1982).
There is no space within this discussion forum to present the rationale for this
approach or to elaborate all of its implications (see Jessop 2001). But it is
worth presenting its spatio-temporal aspects.

First, all structures (and, a fortiori, all institutions) have a definite spatio-
temporal extension. They emerge in specific places and at specific times,
operate on one or more particular scales and with specific temporal horizons
of action, have their own specific ways of articulating and interweaving their
various spatial and temporal horizons of action, develop their own specific
capacities to stretch social relations and/to compress events in space and
time, and, in consequence, have their own specific spatial and temporal
rhythms. These spatio-temporal features should not be seen as accidental or
secondary features of institutions but as constitutive properties that help to
distinguish one organization, institution, or institutional order from another. It is
these features that define the power geometries or ‘envelopes of space-time’
associated with different ways of organizing and institutionalizing social
interaction in specific places (e.g., Massey 1995) and on different scales (e.g.,
Swyngedouw 1997).

Second, all structures privilege the adoption, as a condition for success, of
certain spatial and temporal horizons of action by those seeking to control,
resist, or transform it. There are several aspects to the spatio-temporal
selectivity of an organization, institution, or institutional ensemble. These
include the diverse modalities in and through which spatial and temporal
horizons of action in different fields are produced; and spatial and temporal
rhythms are created. Equally important are the ways that some practices and
strategies are privileged and others made more difficult to realize according to
how well they ‘match’ the temporal and spatial patterns inscribed in the
structures in question. For example, long-term, “patient capital” strategies
oriented to strong competition in a particular region (Standort) are harder to
pursue in a neo-liberal regime that privileges short-term, hypermobile, superfast flows of speculative capital (cf. Gough 2004). More generally, it is important to recognize that spatio-temporal matrices are always differentially distantiated and differentially compressed. Likewise, strategies and tactics can be oriented to the most appropriate spatio-temporal horizons, to changing the forms of chronotopic governance, the reflexive narration of past and present to change the future, and so on.

And, third, a short-term constraint for a given agent or set of agents could become a conjunctural opportunity over a longer time horizon if there is a shift in strategy. This in turn implies that agents may be able to pursue different types of alliance strategy and so modify the selective impact upon themselves and others of social structural constraints and opportunities. Likewise, regarding the spatial dimension of strategic contexts, this approach implies that, since agents may be able to operate across variable spatial scales as well as across several time horizons, spatial structural constraints and conjunctural opportunities are also determined in a 'strategic-relational' manner.

Figure 2 about here

These claims are depicted in figure 2, which presents a spiral 'logic of discovery' that operates across different conceptual levels rather than a hierarchical causal matrix that operates in the real world. In this sense, the concepts introduced after the second row preserve the admissible elements of the preceding row(s). First, the SRA does not posit abstract, unlocated and atemporal structures or wholly routinized activities performed by 'cultural dupes' or habituated actors. Thus, rather than working with a simple dichotomy between external spatio-temporal constraint and an idealist, trans-historical spatio-temporal constructivism (as depicted at level one), the SRA emphasizes that structures are irredeemably concrete, spatialized, and temporalized and that spatio-temporal metrics and horizons of action socially constructed (see level two). Next, as indicated on level three, structures have no meaning outside the context of specific agents pursuing specific strategies -- even if the latter are expressed at the level of practical consciousness rather than in an explicit, reflexive manner. Indeed, it is impossible to conceptualize specific structural constraints outside specific time-horizons and spatial scales of action. For any given constraint (or set of constraints) could be rendered inoperable through competent actors' choice of longer-term and/or spatially more appropriate strategies. For example, where actors are reflexive and engage in strategic calculation, they could set out to disrupt or reconfigure the existing hierarchies of structures and the selective patterns of constraint and opportunity with which they are associated. This indicates that the scope for the reflexive reorganization of structural configurations is subject to structurally-inscribed strategic selectivity (and thus has path-dependent as well as path-shaping aspects); and that the recursive selection of strategies and tactics depends on individual, collective, or organizational learning capacities and on the 'experiences' resulting from the pursuit of different strategies and tactics in different conjunctures (see level four).
Finally, insofar as reflexively reorganized structural configurations and recursively selected strategies and tactics co-evolve over time to produce a relatively stable order out of a potentially unstructured complexity, we can talk of the structured coherence of this co-evolving, self-organizing order (see row five). This can be understood in terms of the continuing interaction between the reflexive reorganization of strategic selectivities and the recursive selection and retention (or evolutionary stabilization) of specific strategies and tactics oriented to those selectivities. We can use these assumptions, concepts, and arguments to theorize spatio-temporal fixes, their relative coherence and stability, and, provided that we also integrate a materialist analysis of the inevitable, incompressible, and unsurpassable contradictions and dilemmas of the capital relation, the necessary crisis-tendencies and eventual weakening of any given spatio-temporal fix.

Conclusions

The strategic-relational approach is a heuristic based on a general social ontology. As such it cannot validate a particular set of concepts for analysing place, space, or scale – this must be derived from other forms of theoretical reflection, empirical observation, or practical intervention. But the SRA can be used to interrogate emerging concepts, highlight their interrelated structural and strategic dimensions, and explore their implications across the different levels of analysis identified in the second to fifth rows of figure two. Applying this approach to the work of specialists in place, space, and scale as well as to my own emerging interests in these topics led to the development of some of my key ideas about the inherent spatio-temporality of capital accumulation and accumulation strategies; of the state, state power, and state projects; and of modes of governance, governance failure, and attempts at meta-governance. It has been particularly important in developing the concept of spatio-temporal fix. This brings together many arguments about the inherently improbable course of capital accumulation and highlights the role of such fixes in displacing and deferring the contradictions and crisis-tendencies of the capital relation to a range of constitutive spatial and temporal outsides. It is also useful for exploring the specific forms that these fixes take in particular accumulation regimes, state forms, and patterns of structured coherence. But this exploration is far from complete and I fully anticipate that there will be further productive exchanges with the many scholars who continue to generate exciting, innovative, and important work on localities, scale, and spatialities.

This leads me to the final question posed to the contributors to this forum: ‘are there any promising issues for a promising explicit dialogue between your field and (economic) geography’? As my remarks above clearly indicate, I have learnt much from geography and geographers. But geography itself is a meeting ground for many disciplines and the geographers who have inspired me are far from narrow disciplinary specialists. Indeed, the time is long past when innovative theorists and investigators moved beyond disciplinarity towards trans- and/or post-disciplinary analyses. Mainstream disciplines correspond to often-outdated epistemic concerns, ideological biases, and ontological realities. A narrow disciplinary approach to a given topic would
focus exclusively on themes identified in terms of a single discipline. For example, in economic analysis, this would entail focusing exclusively on themes that are identified in terms of vulgar political economy and its subsequent development as a specialized, mathematized discipline concerned with economizing behaviour. It would also correspond to the naïve, positivist belief that the market economy exists and can be studied in isolation from other spheres of social relations. Thus it would be better to develop analyses that not only draw on different disciplines and research traditions but also develop new concepts and methodologies that seek to transcend disciplinary boundaries. A pluri- or multi-disciplinary approach starts out from a problem located at the interface of different disciplines and typically combines in a rather mechanical, additive fashion what it regards as the inherently valid understandings and knowledge of different disciplines about their respective objects of inquiry to produce the 'big picture' through 'joined up thinking'. An inter- or trans-disciplinary approach would be better. This would focus on complex problems that can be approached in terms of the categories of two or more disciplines and combines these to produce a more complex, non-additive account. Such an approach is aware of the ontological and epistemic limits of different disciplines, i.e., that they do not correspond to distinct objects in the real world. It therefore accepts the need to combine disciplines to produce a more rounded account of specific themes.

While this is a useful starting point for analyzing complex problems, it would be better still to aim to adopt post-disciplinary approaches. These recognize the conventional nature and inherent limitations of individual disciplines and disciplinariness as a whole and are open to new ideas that may be inconsistent or incommensurable with any or all established disciplines. What distinguishes postdisciplinarity is its principled rejection of the legitimacy of established disciplinary boundaries and its adoption of a more problem-oriented approach. Thus postdisciplinary analyses begin by identifying specific problems independent of how they would be classified, if at all, by different disciplines; and then mobilize, develop, and integrate the necessary concepts, methodologies, and knowledge to address such problems without regard to disciplinary boundaries. As someone who considers himself as a post-disciplinary theorist who is also strongly influenced by pre-disciplinary theorists (such as Marx), I do not have a disciplinarily-defined field and therefore cannot identify promising fields for dialogue with geography. I can confirm that some geographers have had an important influence on the development of my distinctive strategic-relational account of the inherent spatio-temporality of social relations, institutions, and social orders.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Incremental Empirical Extension</th>
<th>Progressive Conceptual Deepening</th>
<th>Ruptural Theoretical Redefinition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Place</td>
<td>Comparing places using the same concepts</td>
<td>Place as connector as well as container</td>
<td>Spatial imaginaries and the politics of place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Space</td>
<td>Study of cross-border regions Spatio-temporal selectivities Globalization as multi-centric, multi-scalar, multi-temporal, multi-form, and multi-causal Time-space Governance</td>
<td></td>
<td>Spatio-temporal fix The importance of constitutive outsides for any given place, space, or scale</td>
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<tr>
<td>Scale</td>
<td>Extend interest from national-states to local governance and European state formation</td>
<td>Interscalar articulation Multi-level meta-governance</td>
<td>The ‘relativization of scale’ The politics of scale and scale jumping</td>
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</tbody>
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Table 1. Examples of Shifts in Theoretical and Methodological Approach to Spatial Analysis Relative to My Initial Positions
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<tr>
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<th>Glurbanization</th>
<th>Glocalization</th>
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<tr>
<td>Strategic Actors</td>
<td>Cities (perhaps as national champions)</td>
<td>Firms (perhaps in strategic alliances)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategies</td>
<td>Place- and space-based Strategies</td>
<td>Firm- or sector-based strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Scales of Activities and Temporalities</td>
<td>Create local differences to capture flows and embed mobile capital</td>
<td>Develop new forms of scalar and/or spatial division of labour</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chronotopic Governance</td>
<td>Rearticulate time and space for structural or system competitive advantages</td>
<td>Rearticulate global and local for dynamic competitive advantages</td>
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Table 2: Glurbanization and Glocalization

Source: Jessop and Sum 2000
Figure 1. A Strategic-Relational Approach to Spatio-Temporal Selectivities

Source: Jessop (2001)
References


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(downloadable in English at http://www.comp.lancs.ac.uk/sociology/papers/jessop-interview.pdf.)


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Endnotes

i There are clear reciprocal implications between shifts in theory and methodology. Changes in the natural and social world can prompt theoretical and methodological shifts. And, for more influential intellectuals, shifts in theoretical or methodological approach can lead not just to a new hermeneutic construal of the real world but also to its semiotic and material transformation. I lay no claim to the latter sort of impact.

ii On the distinction between these three types of impact, see Jessop 1997c.

iii On post-disciplinarity, see Jessop and Sum 2001.

iv For a more detailed intellectual biography, see Jessop 2001b and the diagram at http://www.comp.lancs.ac.uk/sociology/staff/jessop/rj%20diagram2003.doc

v I have modified and extended Collinge’s notion of relativization of scale in this presentation to fit it more closely to my subsequent usage of the term.

vi For my critique of Harvey’s work on fixes (including his recent alternative usage of the term ’spatio-temporal fix’), see Jessop 2004c.